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1 INTRODUCTION 
Hopes towards the opportunities of digitization are huge across all industries, and 
manufacturing is not an exception. Digitization is, for instance, expected to 
improve the efficiency of operations, help firms differentiate from competition, 
as well as open new, unforeseen sources of revenue. 
Although the digital technologies as such are hardly a new thing to the 
manufacturers, question marks still hang over the opportunities and the needed 
new capabilities to exploit them. The history of earlier major technological 
breakthroughs has shown that the greatest gains do not stem from the technology 
as such, but follow only after the organizational structures and processes are re-
engineered to capture the new technology’s full potential (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 
2014). Visions about opportunities and capabilities exist, but so far the great 
success stories of digitization have often come from consumer businesses, not 
manufacturing. The question in the firms seems to be: “When everyone is talking 
about the potential of digitization, what exactly is it that we should do?” 
On a more granular level, the question culminates in the chicken-and-egg 
dilemma: “Which should we try to identify and define first, the opportunities or 
the capabilities?” Concrete business opportunities in for instance big data 
collection and utilization can be hazy, as the customers are often disinclined to 
allow externals access the equipment data without demonstrating the value. 
Especially quantifying the value in advance is a challenge if the business case is 
not crystal clear to the manufacturer itself either. On the other hand, investing in 
building technical and organizational capabilities such as data collection and 
storage systems and analytics can be a risky bet if the eventual purpose and 
payback are unclear. As the uncertainty about the future remains, the result is 
often competing cognitive ‘frames’, i.e., different understandings about what the 
firm should do (Kaplan, 2008). These competing understandings can persist, and 
are only resolved when the firm undertakes strategic decisions determining the 
fate of the strategic initiatives of its key employees. 
From prior literature viewing strategy as a process, we know that the variation, 
selection, and retention of strategic initiatives are important in forming the basis 
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for organizational renewal: realized strategies are the outcome of various 
initiatives, out of which only a part follow the official, intended strategy and 
others are more autonomously defined and selected (Burgelman, 1983, 2005; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). Initiatives, as such, are typically 
proposals for new businesses, capabilities, or capacity (Bower, 2005). The 
initiatives are selected to implementation in an iterative resource allocation 
process, in which the initiatives that are perceived successful receive more and 
more resources (Noda & Bower, 1996). 
The managerial cognition research provides a complementary perspective by 
proposing that the building of organizational capabilities, which often takes place 
in strategic initiatives, is tightly interlinked with the interpretation of 
opportunities. According to Helfat and Winter (2011), organizational capabilities 
exist for a specific purpose. New purposes arise as managers identify new 
opportunities, leading to the matching of opportunities and needed capabilities 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). This matching can result in the definition or assembly 
of a new capability, if a gap is interpreted between the current and the needed 
capabilities. 
Although the role of the strategic initiatives imply that there is an interconnection 
between the two rich fields of research, the dynamics of how strategy work and 
capability cognition interact are not yet perfectly understood. For instance, what 
managers actually do in the matching process and in what sequence are the 
opportunities and capabilities defined have been identified as topics requiring 
more research (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). In addition, the findings of this research 
indicate that there can be differences in how firms respond to a similar 
technological discontinuity, in this case the industrial internet as part of the 
broader digitization of manufacturing. In some cases, the response seems to focus 
on building capabilities, while in others the emphasis is more on defining and 
creating new customer solutions.  
Differences in the organizations’ established strategy processes could possibly 
contribute to these different dynamics. In one case firm, the primary 
management approach was portfolio management of bottom-up defined and 
promoted initiatives, whereas in two other case companies the approach was 
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more top-down structured spearhead programs and initiatives. Therefore, the 
differences in the strategy processes could alter the possible opportunity-
capability matches perceived by managers at different hierarchy levels. 
On the other hand, another potential explanation for the different dynamics could 
stem from how the top managers perceive uncertainty and deal with it. When 
organizations face a higher uncertainty about the external opportunities and 
threats, the identification of possible opportunities and the right organizational 
capabilities becomes more difficult. The more uncertain the possible scenarios 
and future outcomes are perceived to be, the more challenging it is to form and 
execute actionable strategies (Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 1997). Increasing 
uncertainty also forms a seedbed for competing cognitive frames, i.e., differing 
managerial perceptions about which opportunities and capabilities form the best 
match for the organization (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Kaplan, 2008). According to 
Kaplan (2008, p. 748), overcoming the uncertainty and spurring action 
necessitates the “resolution of framing contests”. Depending on how the contest 
is resolved, it would seem plausible to suggest that the managerial cognition can 
also affect the strategy process. 
Together, the presumed, potentially recursive interplay between the strategy 
process and managerial cognition sets the basis for the first research question of 
this thesis: 
 How do the managerial cognition and organization’s strategy process 
affect the pattern of matching opportunities and capabilities when 
responding to a technological discontinuity? 
Following from the identification of what organizational capabilities are needed, 
another interesting question is how well organizations are aware of their existing 
organizational capabilities. A common part of the strategy-making in firms is the 
identification of so called capability gaps, i.e., differences between the needed and 
current levels of capabilities. Related to the framing contest, Eggers and Kaplan 
(2013, p. 323) have called for more research on the processes and actions by 
which managers can increase their “awareness and agreement” to avoid for 
example “the inefficient allocation of resources as different managers pull 
capabilities in different directions”. Because a technological discontinuity, such 
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as the industrial internet, can imply a need for a leap to build new kinds of 
capabilities, I formalize the second research question as follows: 
 How do managers identify and bridge the gaps between the existing and 
the needed organizational capabilities when responding to a technological 
discontinuity? 
In addition to answering the two theoretical research questions, a further 
objective of my master’s thesis is to provide more empirical understanding about 
how opportunities and capabilities are identified, defined, and developed in 
manufacturing firms responding to digitization of manufacturing. The reasons 
for selecting this research scope are twofold. First, in a country like Finland 
undergoing great economic challenges, there is an urgent call for more knowledge 
about actions that could increase the productivity (Borg & Vartiainen, 2015). For 
Finland’s export-driven economy, the productivity of the large manufacturing 
firms is especially vital. With my thesis, I try to illustrate current opportunity-
capability matching practices at some leading manufacturers in Finland. 
Second, focusing on how different firms that share a similar traditional business-
to-business manufacturing heritage respond to a partially same technological 
discontinuity – more specifically, the emergence of industrial internet – enables 
comparing the findings and possibly even generalizing some of them as 
recommended industry practices. Industrial internet is a broad concept which 
generally refers to the collection and integration of installed base equipment data 
with the aim to unveil and capture new value creation opportunities. The broad 
definition leaves room for a wide range of potential applications. Indeed, it is vital 
to note that the discontinuity is not necessarily that radical; only occasionally it 
leads to a rapid establishment of new businesses or drastic industry 
transformation. In manufacturing firms, industrial internet and digitization may 
rather be seen as a new step on a continuum that has started with automation and 
servitization development already some 20–30 years ago. 
Starting from chapter 2, I first present the theoretical background of strategy 
process and capability cognition, and combine implied interconnections between 
initiatives and capabilities into a synthesizing framework. In chapter 3, I present 
the used research methodology and describe the data, as well as its collection and 
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processing. Data-based findings are discussed and synthesized in a dialogue with 
prior theoretical findings in chapter 4. In chapter 5, I discuss both theoretical 
implications to the resource allocation process literature and capability cognition 
research, as well as suggest managerial implications for practitioners. Finally, in 
chapter 6, I evaluate this study and its limitations, identify open questions for 
future research, and present my concluding remarks. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
I have divided this literature review chapter into three parts. First, the resource 
allocation process theory of strategy-making, is presented in chapter 2.1. Second, 
the theoretical foundations of the capability cognition model are presented and 
discussed in chapter 2.2. In chapter 2.3, I synthesize the identified 
interconnecting parts of both theories and present an integrated framework 
suggesting possible reciprocal mechanisms between strategic initiatives and 
capability cognition before the empirical part of the thesis. 
2.1 Strategy-making as a process of iterative resource allocation 
To what extent do strategic initiatives actually follow from a deliberate strategic 
plan versus autonomous bottom-up activities? A commonly agreed view in the 
strategy process literature is that realized strategy is an outcome of both 
deliberate and emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1978). Deliberate strategy is the 
realized part of intended top-down strategy which is never implemented entirely, 
whereas emergent strategy results from the autonomous strategic behavior all 
around the organization (Mintzberg, 1978; Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). 
Strategy process literature has emphasized the emergent strategy aspect, 
suggesting that decisions and actions constituting the strategy are in reality 
“distributed across multiple levels of an organization” (Noda & Bower, 1996, p. 
159) and not centralized just around the top management. From the strategy 
process view, strategic actions – defined as initiatives – are given resources 
iteratively based on their perceived success (e.g. Burgelman, 1983; Noda & 
Bower, 1996). Initiatives that will eventually form the realized strategy are the 
ones that have survived this intra-firm selection environment, as well as the 
external selection environment, i.e., the market. Thus, strategy making is rather 
evolutionary in nature rather than following a rational, predetermined plan in a 
disciplined way. (Burgelman, 2005)  
Because the initiatives may be either induced or autonomous, i.e., either aligned 
with the organization’s prevailing concept of strategy or not, realized strategies 
typically contain elements of both deliberate strategic planning and emergent 
strategic behavior (Burgelman, 1983; Mintzberg, 1978; Mirabeau & Maguire, 
2014). According to the cornerstone book by Bower (1970), the initiatives contain, 
7 
 
at the operating management level, proposals for business-unit strategies and 
new investments that pursue new business opportunities, new capacity, or – in 
effect – new capabilities (Bower, 1970, 2005). 
In the original Bower-Burgelman (B-B) process which was named after the two 
pioneers of the research stream, there are four interlinked processes. Definition 
and impetus are core processes that lead to the establishment and selection of 
certain initiatives, and structural and strategic context determination are 
corporate-level processes that the top management can use to frame what kind of 
initiatives are proposed and selected (Burgelman, 1983). 
Since the foundational and highly influential studies by Bower (1970) and 
Burgelman (1983), the resource allocation process model has received many 
revisions and extensions. The revised model by Bower and Gilbert (2005), 
presented in figure 2.1, provides a rather comprehensive summary of the 
findings. The central processes of definition and selection interact with each other 
and occur simultaneously across all the management levels, and are influenced 
by the corporate-level structural and strategic context as well as the external 
product market and capital market contexts (Bower & Gilbert, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.1. A revised model of resource allocation process by Bower and 
Gilbert (2005). 
Although the undertone in many resource allocation process papers is that the 
initiatives emerge more often bottom-up than top-down, the revised model 
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acknowledges that both definition and selection processes can stem from any of 
the three layers of management: corporate (top), middle-level, or operating 
(Bower & Gilbert, 2005). In a normal situation, operating managers initiate and 
champion the proposals, middle managers translate the definitions to fit the 
strategic context and act as a filter for initiatives by brokering, and the top 
management aligns the initiatives to fit both the strategic context, corporate 
goals, and other initiatives, and then commit to the chosen ones by allocating 
more resources to them (Bower, 1970; Bower & Gilbert, 2005). However, the top 
managers influence the bottom-up process, if not directly, at least indirectly. 
Lovas and Ghoshal (2000, p. 875) have suggested that managers can “guide the 
evolution of strategy” by designing the “organization as an ecological system” on 
purpose. In practice, this would happen altering the strategic and structural 
contexts, e.g. the formal structure and organizational routines or the people 
working on the strategic initiatives (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000). 
The model takes into consideration also the effects of the product market context, 
originally emphasized by Christensen and Bower (1996), and the capital market 
context, brought to attention by Noda and Bower (1996). Both have been shown 
to influence the definition and selection processes, and they both also have a 
reciprocal effect to the structural and strategic context (Bower & Gilbert, 2005; 
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Noda & Bower, 1996). 
First, product market is where the firm interacts with its customers by selling 
products or services and collecting payments. Christensen and Bower (1996) have 
shown that a firm’s dependence on its existing customers can lead to a failure of 
capturing new disruptive business opportunities. Often, the radical technological 
innovation leading to disruption may even stem from the leading firm itself. 
However, the performance of the nascent technology is in many cases inferior to 
the dominant older technology. Because of this, the existing customers are not 
willing to switch to the new technology, and the lack of this important resource 
contribution makes the seller firm’s salespeople and profit-and-loss-responsible 
managers reluctant to promote initiatives using the new technology. As a result, 
the new technology may be spun out or abandoned. If the technology finds a new, 
more suitable home from another market, its development may be accelerated to 
the point that its performance beats the old technology. At this stage, the 
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disruption in the original product market can be aggressive and lead to the failure 
of incumbent players. (Christensen & Bower, 1996)  
Second, the capital markets, namely investors and lenders, also affect the 
definition and selection processes (Noda & Bower, 1996). Sull (2005a) has stated 
that while the normal bottom-up process of initiative definition and championing 
may work well for new investments, it does not effectively generate disinvestment 
initiatives. The reason for this lies in the personal biases and organizational 
myopia. At the lower levels of an organization, the perspective is more focused on 
an individual’s own business unit and narrower across business units. Given this 
and the fact that the individuals’ worries about the future of their own job, the 
bottom-up initiatives do not typically bring up disinvestments (Sull, 2005a). 
According to Sull (2005a), this kind of evaluation and decision-making is more 
natural for the corporate management’s top-down initiatives, because their 
responsibility is by definition to take care about the owners’ interests. If the biases 
have led to a harmful myopia also in the top management, the board of directors 
representing the owners or important lenders may decide to exercise their power 
and direct disinvestments, or certain new investments (Sull, 2005a). 
A final important extension of the revised model, which is however not directly 
visible from the model picture, is the effect of cognitive frames on definition and 
selection as well as on the interaction between the processes. Gilbert (2005a, 
2005b) has proposed that a strong threat perception leads to an aggressive 
resource allocation to disruptive technologies but at the same time “strategic 
plans will be rigidly defined” (Gilbert, 2005a, p. 288), i.e., the responsive 
initiatives and business models become narrowly defined. The narrow definition 
is an outcome of contraction of authority which is typical for threat situations and 
which “can block the traditional bottom-up process of resource allocation” 
(Gilbert, 2005a, p. 289). Therefore, strategic redefinition of the selection process 
is needed when responding to a threat, or else the organization may be stuck with 
invalid resource commitment patterns. 
2.2 Managerial cognition and organizational capabilities 
Organizational capabilities are sets of organizational skills used for a specific 
purpose (Helfat & Winter, 2011). According to Eggers and Kaplan (2013), new 
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purposes for new organizational capabilities arise as managers match their 
interpretations of the external opportunities and threats with the perceived 
organizational capabilities. Nevertheless, the same authors emphasize that the 
actual mechanisms leading to the creation of organizational capabilities are not 
yet fully understood. The standard model (figure 2.2) in strategic management 
research suggests that capabilities are formed from organizations’ accumulated 
experience, i.e., prior performance. The resulting capabilities, on their behalf, 
drive the future organizational performance as they are deployed through the 
strategic choices by managers. (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013) 
 
Figure 2.2. The standard model of capabilities and performance according to 
Eggers and Kaplan (2013). 
In their recursive model (figure 2.3), Eggers and Kaplan (2013) suggest many 
improvements to the linear model. In addition to presenting five recursive links 
between different elements (dashed lines in figure 2.3), the model presents 
routines as the link between experience and capabilities. Routines are patterns of 
actions that constitute organizational skills, i.e., they are mutually agreed-upon, 
reliably repeated ways of doing things between multiple organizational actors. 
Routines are constructed out of experiences either with or without conscious 
effort, especially if the prior performance is perceived as positive, if the 
experiences bear a resemblance to existing routines, or if the experiences are 
repeated over time. Routines are building blocks from which capabilities can be 
assembled. (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013) 
In the model, capability assembly from routines is activated when managers 
interpret a purpose for a new capability, while forming their understandings 
about what the organization can already do. These two cognitive processes 
interact with each other and making a distinction between them in reality may be 
difficult. (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013) The implication that follows from this is that 
cognition plays a pivotal role in the process of assembling routines into 
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capabilities. According to Helfat and Winter (2011, p. 1244), a capability exists 
only if there is a “specific and intended purpose” for it. Without the interpretation 
of a purpose, there are only routines and experience and no capability (Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2013). In addition, existing capabilities set frames for managerial 
interpretations of what the organization can already do (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). 
 
Figure 2.3. A recursive model of cognition and capabilities by Eggers and 
Kaplan (2013). 
New purposes arise as managers interpret how well the existing capabilities 
match the identified opportunities and threats in the external environment. In 
the recursive model, matching process triggers the identification of a purpose for 
a capability. Furthermore, purpose identification can activate the mindful 
selection of experience for new routines, if suitable capability building blocks do 
not yet exist. (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013) 
Despite the improvements, the recursive model still leaves many questions open, 
especially related to how the construction of routines, assembly of capabilities, 
and the matching of capabilities with the opportunities are actually done. Eggers 
and Kaplan (2013) themselves suggest multiple topics for further research. There 
is only little knowledge about how managers can and actually do influence the 
whole process. Starting from the experience encoding, it is not well known how 
managers intentionally influence the direction, volume and efficiency of the 
encoding. Second, it is still unclear what kind of actions managers at different 
hierarchy levels can and do take to increase the amount of possible capability 
building blocks. Third, the mechanisms of how managers experiment with 
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different capability building blocks, familiarize themselves with the existing 
routines and environmental opportunities, and agree mutually upon allocating 
resources to the development of certain capabilities over others, have also 
received only little attention so far. Finally, the specific steps of the matching 
process, especially regarding the opportunity identification in non-turbulent 
times and capability transformation and redeployment, are proposed by the 
authors. (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013) 
2.3 Integrated model of strategic initiatives and capability cognition 
Comparison of the resource allocation process model to the recursive model of 
capability cognition shows interesting similarities. Figure 2.4 presents an 
integrated framework adding the strategic initiatives to the capability cognition 
model by Eggers and Kaplan (2013). First, both models are evolutionary and 
recursive, meaning that they both are based on variation, selection, and retention 
that are repeated cyclically. In Eggers and Kaplan’s (2013) model, variation in 
experience enables a greater variation in routines. A greater variety of these 
capability building blocks enables a greater variety of possible capabilities, and 
therefore a higher flexibility in possible strategic choices the managers can make. 
Selection and retention are also clearly present. Certain experiences are selected, 
mindfully or not, to become encoded into routines, and then preserved if proven 
useful in practice. Similarly, some routines may be selected in the assembly of 
new capabilities, and the capabilities are retained if the strategic choices giving 
the capabilities their purpose are successful. (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013) 
Whereas the variation, selection, and retention of experiences form the basis for 
organizational capabilities, the variation, selection, and retention of strategic 
initiatives through resource allocation constitute the realized strategy 
(Burgelman, 2005). According to Burgelman (1983), bottom-up initiatives stem 
from the local problem-solving activities that link market needs with technical 
solutions. Clearly, this problem-solving would be likely based on the experience 
of the individuals and teams, and this experience would have been accumulated 
as a result of past positive and negative performances. Therefore, it could be 
argued that the same experience base that forms the micro-foundations of 
routines also provides the basis for initiatives. 
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Figure 2.4. Integrated model of capability cognition and strategic initiatives. 
In addition, existing organizational routines – which in effect are a part of an 
organization’s structural context – direct individuals’ attention towards certain 
issues and away from others. This naturally affects what kind of initiatives get 
defined and selected. Because organizational routines are agreed-upon ways of 
working, the more stabilized and rigid the routines are, the more difficult it is to 
mobilize resources behind an autonomous initiative. If a bottom-up initiative 
stems only from the existing experience and routine base of the organization, it 
would seem plausible to suggest that experience and routines affect the 
autonomous emergence of initiatives. Heterogeneous experience and routines 
would likely enable a higher variety of both routines and initiatives in contrast. 
Since the strategic choices – or strategic commitments – by the managers do not 
only define the capability needs but also set the organization’s strategic context, 
the commitments would also affect the induced initiative creation directly. The 
indirect influence by managers, i.e., the guided evolution proposed by Lovas and 
Ghoshal (2000), could in the context of Eggers and Kaplan’s (2013) model be 
exercised through the intentional actions to augment the experience pool or to 
alter the organizational routines for example with an organizational 
restructuring. The influence on later-emerging initiatives would in this case be 
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indirect, because the change in experience pool and routines would likely yield 
also unexpected autonomous initiatives. Eventually, autonomous initiatives can 
also affect the structural and strategic context and the capability cognition: the 
ones that survive the intra-firm and extra-firm selection can become retroactively 
rationalized as a part of the strategic context (Burgelman, 1983). As such, 
autonomous initiatives are an important source of strategic variation that enables 
strategic flexibility and corporate renewal over time (Burgelman, 1983; Mirabeau 
& Maguire, 2014).  
Second, initiatives would appear to be a natural source of purposes for new 
capabilities. New purposes arise as the result of the matching process, in which 
managers interpret the opportunities and capabilities and try to fit them together. 
An initiative almost by nature entails a more or less specific idea of such a match. 
They are non-routine activities, and their goal is the creation of a new business, a 
new capability, or new capacity (Bower, 2005). For instance, internal corporate 
ventures (ICV) are initiatives that aim to create new viable businesses to the firm. 
In these cases, the link between initiatives and capability creation is obvious: 
when pursuing a new environmental opportunity with an initiative, the matching 
process needs to be revised, and new purposes arise for capabilities. 
A capability initiative would not necessarily be launched to respond only new 
opportunities, but also to respond to an identified mismatch between existing and 
needed capabilities in the case of an existing opportunity. In this case, the 
perceived capability mismatch would inhibit the firm from fully capturing the 
opportunity. Similarly, a capacity initiative would respond to an identified 
capacity shortage having similar consequences to a capability gap. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that initiatives may lead to capability creation 
indirectly. In their study of internal corporate ventures (ICV), Keil et al. (2009) 
found that capabilities were developed in the venturing process even when the 
initiatives themselves did not achieve the business goals that were set to them. 
Still, these ventures were not necessarily considered failures because of the 
perceived indirect benefits provided by the nascent, new capabilities. Alike 
capability building blocks, the resulting capabilities were often transformed and 
15 
 
redeployed in other, new ventures which would not have been possible without 
these capabilities. (Keil et al., 2009) 
Third, initiative definition and selection occur at all levels of management (Bower 
& Gilbert, 2005). Therefore, also the capability cognition is likely to happen 
similarly. At lower levels, it can be more about individual and team capabilities, 
and at the business-unit- or firm-level about organizational capabilities. 
The fourth common denominator between the models is coping with uncertainty. 
According to Burgelman (1983, p. 238), strategic context determination process 
is activated when the corporate management realizes that “the current strategy is 
no longer entirely adequate but does not know how it should be changed until, 
through the selection of autonomous initiatives from below, it is apparent which 
new businesses can become part of the business portfolio”. Similarly, routines 
may be developed and stored “without knowledge of their value nor their eventual 
development” as a sort of a real options strategy (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013, p. 301). 
Finally, the generation of new capability building blocks can be intentionally 
fostered by the top management through deliberate changes in the firm’s 
structural context. As part of guiding the evolution towards a certain direction, 
organizational changes can increase the variation in the organizational processes, 
as people need to collaborate with new people and possibly in new ways (Lovas & 
Ghoshal, 2000). The managerial actions to change the organizational structure 
do not necessarily increase the variation within existing routines, but rather set 
the requirement to create new ones. For instance, when pursuing market 
opportunities that lie beyond the capabilities of a single organizational unit or 
responding to industry convergence, the top management may wish to develop 
strategic flexibility by recombining resources from separate business units or 
even by integrating entire units (Raynor, 2005).  
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3 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
The objective of the study was to gain understanding about what kind of 
challenges digitization sets to managing strategic initiatives and organizational 
capabilities in manufacturing firms. Because of the interpreted theoretical gaps 
in the intersection of strategy process and capability cognition literature, I used a 
multiple case study research design to explore and build grounded theory based 
on the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). In order to ensure the scholarly rigor of the 
study, I selected the Gioia method as the analytical approach. Gioia method 
provides good means to articulate the grounded theory and present the inductive 
research process (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). The method combines 
inductive, first-order open codes and more theory-driven second-order codes 
into a rigorous data structure (Gioia et al., 2013; Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007). 
Therefore, the followed reasoning logic was not exclusively inductive but also 
abductive (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). 
In this chapter, I describe first the research context, and then the data collection 
procedures before presenting my data analysis process as well as the resulted data 
structure. 
3.1 Research context 
The research context was three Finnish manufacturing firms – pseudonyms 
Tammer, Newland and Bothnia – and their digitization initiatives, especially the 
ones related to the industrial internet. All the firms were among the global leaders 
in their respective industrial goods and services industries. The markets of each 
firm were relatively stable: the equipment markets were cyclical but quite mature, 
with the high capital intensiveness and need for a strong engineering expertise, 
global footprint, and good reputation as entry barriers to new players. Because of 
this, industrial internet alone was not expected to change the industries 
overnight. 
In Finland’s scale, they were large-size stock-listed, export-oriented firms: in 
2014, each firm generated single-digit billion euros in annual revenues, and the 
number of employees was in the range of 10 000–20 000 people. Although every 
firm had also notable service sales (the share of service sales ranging from 
approximately 25–40 % of annual net sales), traditional equipment 
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manufacturing and sales formed the largest share of the business volume. Based 
on their own words and investor presentations, all the firms were seeking to grow 
their service businesses to bring additional growth and stability against the 
cyclicality. However, the challenge in moving to services was related to 
‘converting’ not just the own organizations but also the customers to them. As put 
by one of the interviewees, the sizes of service deals were “peanuts” in comparison 
to the equipment delivery projects, and the customers expected to receive the 
services free of charge. 
As is common to mature markets, the competitive landscape for each firm was 
characterized with intensive price competition. However, none of the case firms 
was trying to distinguish from the competition primarily with lower costs, but 
rather with superior quality and value of equipment and services. Over their long 
histories, each firm had built high-class engineering capabilities, which also 
formed the roots for digitization. The technical solutions and related offerings 
had evolved from improving component- or machine-level performance to 
higher-, more systemic-level optimization of sub-processes or even entire end-to-
end processes over the entire equipment lifecycle. Advanced digital and mobile 
communication technologies were seen as the enabler for developing more 
granular services and products to diversified customer needs, while 
simultaneously improving the delivery efficiency. 
3.2 Data collection procedures 
In total, there were 28 interviews with 8 or 9 interviews from each case firm. 
Altogether 23 individuals from corporate, middle, and operating management 
were interviewed (see table 3.1). Three interviews were held with one interviewee, 
and two with another interviewee. The interviewees represented corporate and 
middle managers with business responsibility (e.g. CEO, Presidents of business 
areas, Vice Presidents of business units or lines) as well as top, middle and 
operating managers who were closely involved in the digitization initiatives. In 
order to validate findings and to form a more holistic view of the entire 
organization’s attitude towards the initiatives, we interviewed also some middle 
and operating managers who were not directly involved in the digitization 
initiatives but whose areas of responsibility were adjacent to and partly 
interdependent with them. 
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Table 3.1. Interviewees by management level. 
Management level Title and area of responsibility 
Corporate management Chief Executive Officer 
 Chief Digital Officer 
 
Chief Information Officer 
Senior Vice President, strategy 
 President, business area 
 President, business area 
Middle management Senior Vice President, business unit 
 Vice President, division 
 Vice President, business line 
 Vice President, business line 
Operating management Director, services 
 Director, business unit 
 Director, business unit 
 Director, research 
 Director, product development 
 Director, software development 
 General Manager, business unit 
 General Manager, product development 
 General Manager, information management 
 General Manager, business/service development 
 Program Manager 
 Product/Project Manager 
 Team Leader, technology support 
 
An interview guide (see appendix) was created based on preliminary interviews, 
existing literature, and research team discussions. Nevertheless, the interview 
guide was not followed slavishly, rather, the purpose was to keep the interviews 
only semi-structured if possible and let the interviewees express their thoughts in 
their own words as much as possible. Follow-up questions were then used to 
specify the answers in greater detail. The interview guide as such was not 
modified between interviews. Rather, interview questions were selected, 
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modified, or left out depending on their relevance to each interviewee, the 
discussed topic, and the natural flow of the interview. 
The interviews were held mainly face-to-face with each interviewee, except for 
one interview where two interviewees were interviewed in the same session. The 
interviews were recorded and the recordings were transcribed by a transcription 
service. The ready transcripts were checked and corrected by the interviewer 
before uploading them to the qualitative analysis software file. Three video 
conference interviews where exceptions: during them, interview memos were 
written by the interviewer post-interview due to poor connections and sound 
quality that prevented recording. In these cases, the interview memos were sent 
to the interviewees for possible corrections and additions before uploading them 
to the analysis software. 
3.3 Data analysis 
Collected interview data was analyzed using a qualitative research software, 
Atlas.TI. Following the Gioia method, checked interview transcripts were first 
analyzed using open coding, i.e., the codes were created and named based on the 
data and without any specific theoretical framework in mind (Gioia et al., 2013). 
A short comment describing the quotation’s content or simply repeating an 
interesting sentence by the interviewee was added every time a new piece of text 
was labeled with it. After open-coding six interviews representing different case 
firms, I selected Tammer as the lead case, and next open-coded all the nine 
Tammer interview transcripts. 
In the axial coding stage, three thematic codes were selected to describe how the 
sequencing of opportunity and capability identification would be expected to 
happen in the matching process. I formed altogether 18 thematic codes based on 
both data and literature on resource allocation process and capability cognition 
following the Gioia method. According to Gioia et al. (2013, p. 20), the objective 
of forming thematic codes is to identify “concepts that might help - - describe and 
explain the phenomena”  that are being observed. Next, I formed a network view 
of the thematic and open codes to determine connections and associations. In the 
process, overlapping open codes were merged together and unclear code names 
were rephrased to better describe the content.  
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Figure 3.1. Data structure, part I. 
In the third stage of the analysis, I examined the code network for possible 
overarching patterns and novelty of findings (Gioia et al., 2013). This 
examination was a reflexive, dialogical process between existing literature and 
data, the aim being to find the explanation between them (Mantere & Ketokivi, 
2013). During this process, I coded also the remaining interviews from Newland 
and Bothnia, applying both new open codes and existing ones created originally 
for Kalmar. The resulting 337 open codes were allocated to the thematic codes 
which were also revised and redefined, reducing the final number from 18 to 9. 
Finally, I identified three overarching themes – ‘matching of opportunities and 
capabilities’, ‘definition and selection of initiatives’, and ‘interaction with the 
external environment’ – based on the thematic codes. The final data structure 
showing the overarching dimensions, second-order categories and examples of 
the first-order categories is presented in figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. Data structure, part II.  
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4 FINDINGS 
Out of the completed data structures, I considered the theme ‘matching of 
opportunities and capabilities’ to entail the most scientific and managerial 
novelty. In this chapter, I first elaborate the three thematic codes that were 
interpreted to belong under the matching. The first section (4.1) presents how 
managerial commitment to industrial internet initiatives was manifested in the 
case firms. In the following sections (4.2 and 4.3), I discuss more specifically how 
the matching of opportunities and capabilities was externalized. In the last two 
sections, I synthesize my abductive findings into two propositions (4.4 and 4.5). 
4.1 Managerial commitment in digitization initiatives 
Managerial cognition about the opportunities and needed capabilities has been 
found to guide the organization to build those capabilities (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2009; Laamanen & Wallin, 2009). Organizational orientation, the “organization-
level corollary for attention” and constituting of the firm’s capabilities related to 
a certain industry, can accelerate or decelerate this effect (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009, 
p. 463). 
There were significant differences in the management approaches between the 
case firms. In Tammer, the prevailing management approach was to a great 
extent a bottom-up process. According to the resource allocation process 
literature, this approach is typical especially in stable conditions: initiatives are 
defined and selected first by the operating and middle-level managers, and the 
top managers influence the resulting strategy rather by either rationalizing the 
passed-through initiatives retroactively or guiding the strategy evolution toward 
a certain direction by making changes to the firm’s strategic and structural 
context (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983; Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Sull, 2005a). 
This can be both effective and efficient: when the definition and selection of 
initiatives are delegated and decentralized throughout the organization, the 
organization’s performance is less dependent on the bounded rationality of only 
few top managers, and there can be more sensitivity and faster responsiveness to 
customer needs (Sull, 2005b). 
In Tammer, the corporate management set the strategic direction and business 
goals to the business areas, which then crafted their respective strategies and 
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investment proposals rather autonomously from the bottom up. The corporate 
management then managed the strategies and proposals akin to a portfolio, 
making the high-level resource allocation decisions and ensuring the mutual 
alignment between the business areas. Overall, the corporate management’s role 
in strategy making seemed to be rather limited. 
“We haven’t started from building a corporate digitization strategy that would then somehow 
affect the business areas, but the business areas need to have [digitization] as a strong part of 
their own business area strategies. - - [In the corporate management] we’ve been trying 
consciously not to organize this so that this wouldn’t become one of those topics that ‘okay, now 
the corporation started to coordinate this and let’s make an enormous roadmap and terrible 
bureaucracy’, and so on. Because of that we’ve been trying consciously to keep it so that there 
would be freedom to experiment and do, and the corporation’s role would rather be to support 
and encourage the initiatives.” –Chief Information Officer, Tammer 
The downside of the bottom-up process is that when there are changes in the 
firm’s environment, the initiatives that it generates may not address the new 
challenges and opportunities adequately (Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Kuemmerle, 2005; Sull, 2005a). Although some researchers have claimed that 
the autonomous bottom-up strategizing can be the key for corporate renewal and 
long-term success (Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014), rapidly increasing uncertainty 
can transform the matching process into a politically-motivated contest of 
competing cognitive frames, i.e., individual interpretations about what should be 
done (Kaplan, 2008). In these situations, the top managers can decide to 
influence the strategy process directly by making interventions (Doz, 2005; 
Eisenmann & Bower, 2000; Raynor, 2005; Sull, 2005a). 
In contrast to Tammer, where the digitization initiatives were managed mainly as 
any other development projects, both Newland and Bothnia had top-down 
cascading strategies for digitization with stronger and more direct top 
management influence. In Newland, the CEO had been promoting digitization for 
years and a top management team member was responsible for the corporation’s 
overall digitization strategy, which entailed multiple programs and sub-projects. 
“[As an answer to the question of who is in charge of running the digitization strategy:] – That’s 
myself. - - We have some projects under that, mainly on the development side. So when we’re 
launching out and rolling out new initiatives, there are sub-projects for each one of those.” –
Chief Digital Officer, Newland 
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Although the original idea for building remote monitoring and data analytics 
capabilities came from a customer segment with a clear need, Newland’s top 
management had committed to building and applying those capabilities also in 
the larger customer segment, which seemed to be satisfied even with the more 
standardized equipment and services. The top management’s perseverance was 
seen crucial to the continued investments in capability building. 
“So really from the top management there has been lots of support and actually, this would not 
never have happened if [the CEO] couldn’t have said that ‘we will start doing this, make sure 
this happens’. So he was and the whole, the upper layer of the company was very much 
supporting this.” –Program Manager, digitization initiatives, Newland 
Also in Bothnia, the CEO was actively promoting the digitization, but the most 
vocal champion of it was one of the business area presidents. The reasons for this 
were that most of the strategic digitization initiatives were ideated and 
implemented in the respective business area for which the president was overall 
responsible, but also the president’s personal interest and enthusiasm toward 
digitization. In the interview, Bothnia’s CEO emphasized the importance of 
having “visionary people” who could promote new ideas become reality. 
“It’s like any business. People is, the business is people. People who make things happen. - - The 
guy who’s head of [disguised business area], he’s a visionary on that side. - - he’s totally sold on 
to this. He’s very much into that.” –CEO, Bothnia 
Visionary people alone are not enough for initiative implementation if their 
cognitive frames do not win the competing frames and the change-resisting 
inertia of the prevailing ones (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). The structural context 
and its performance measurement systems also affect what individuals are 
incentivized to do (Burgelman, 1983; Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). In Newland’s 
case, the top management’s commitment to digitization helped dissolve some 
managers’ doubts regarding the business benefits. 
“When you start developing this kind of thing, of course, although we have good backup from 
the CEO level that, for sure there are other levels of organizations in our, in the company so, 
some could argue that okay, I don't see the business value of this development, why should we 
continue et cetera. But it's the same thing nowadays when people talk about industrial internet 
because there are not so many, good examples of how this business value has realized.” –
Program manager, digitization initiatives, Newland 
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Tammer’s first big data initiative provides an example of the opposite outcome. 
The initiative was – quite exceptionally – driven as a corporate-level initiative 
which had received the top management approval for resourcing. For instance, 
certain experts had been hired from the outside of Tammer to bring in new 
personal capabilities. However, the initiative stalled before the implementation 
due to the middle managers’ reluctance to commit to it. The middle managers, 
who were in charge of the continuous business performance of the units, were 
concerned about the envisioned benefits which they did not consider to be 
specified concretely enough. As a result, they were unwilling to invest the 
resources – and their personal reputation – in an initiative that appeared to be 
risky. 
“It was well-funded and the people [had] even been recruited to initiative but no connection to 
everyday business or the people who were running the everyday business.” –President, business 
area, Tammer 
”The ideas have been, let’s not say weak, but some of the ideas have not been thought thoroughly 
through from the business perspective.” –Vice President, business line, Tammer 
Interestingly, even though Tammer’s top management had considered the 
initiative to be important and gave it a lot of their attention, they were not 
eventually committed enough to force the initiative through the middle 
management’s resistance. Another interpretation is that the top managers were 
more committed to the performance goals they had set to the business areas and 
lines than to the single initiative. This finding indicates that it is important to 
make a distinction between managerial attention and managerial commitment 
when discussing managerial cognition. According to Kraatz and Zajac (2001), 
resources as such can be interpreted as commitments. Investing in acquiring 
resources and allocating existing resources to certain uses instead of others are, 
in effect, outcomes of true managerial commitments. The existing resource 
commitments can cause change-resisting inertia, because the decision to 
reallocate resources to a new initiative simultaneously implies a change in 
managerial commitment – the existing resource commitments tend to defend 
themselves (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). 
The example from Tammer also indicates that the top management attention 
alone may not mobilize organizational action, if the middle managers have 
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control over important implementation resources but lack commitment, and the 
top management is not willing to make the change happen with a top-down 
intervention. This finding could explain possible ‘anomalies’, where the top 
management attention to a phenomenon is high but organizational action is not 
mobilized, contrary to the suggestions by Eggers and Kaplan (2009) and 
Laamanen and Wallin (2009). 
The data suggests also that an organization’s prior experience does not affect only 
what kind of routines and capabilities are available (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013), but 
also the way how matching is done in the organization. In Bothnia, the past 
success stories appeared to bolster the managers’ confidence that being an early 
adopter of new technologies was essential to the firm’s survival and would pay off 
eventually. 
“So you have to be on the leading edge on this part and the one who's not adopting this, they are 
going to be losers, because the way you interact with your customer is going to be totally 
different in the coming years. This is a survival game and you have to be on the leading edge to 
it. - - Where Bothnia suddenly is on the front side, while competition start developing those 
things, recently coming up with new, while we have many, many years of experience from this 
from power plants and from other businesses. When the customer is seeing that is that okay the 
Bothnia, has adopted this long, long before anyone else.” –CEO, Bothnia 
When digitization and the building of more systematic data collection and 
analytics capabilities were brought back to Tammer’s strategic agenda two years 
after the big data initiative, the top management abstained from making strong 
direct interventions but rather settled for changing the firm’s strategic context, 
aligning the previously dissonant bottom-up digitization initiatives with it 
(Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). Although the top management paid more attention 
to these initiatives e.g. by following closely the digitization roadmap of a certain 
business area, they did not seem to feel any need to break the bottom-up process 
and abandon the high-level portfolio management approach. 
“The methods and the processes are the same as in any other project but in the monitoring there 
indeed is that difference that the progress of this [digitization roadmap] is followed up at the 
business area level and the corporate level. That is the difference. The method is the same but 
who is monitoring it, that goes all the way up.” Vice President, business line, Tammer 
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Table 4.1. Manifestation of managerial commitment to industrial internet in 
the case firms. 
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 “The business in Tammer is done through the business areas. Resource allocation and portfolio 
management, those are corporate-level issues.” –Senior Vice President, Strategy, Tammer 
Overall, the manifestation of managerial commitment to digitization and 
industrial internet initiatives in the three case firms is summarized in table 4.1. 
Examples of how the commitment was manifested is categorized separately for 
the levels of top, middle, and operating management.  
4.2 Inside-out focus on building capabilities before defining 
opportunities 
Inside-out focus refers to the sequence in which managers focus first on building 
“potentially useful capabilities”, and only then engage in the process of matching 
the capabilities to identified opportunities (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013, p. 321). 
Eggers and Kaplan (2013) acknowledge that a pure inside-out approach is in 
reality an oversimplification but suggest that in big incumbent firms the approach 
probably contains more inside-out than outside-in. 
Inside-out approach was applied in all the case firms to a degree that varied 
depending on the stage of development each firm was in. In general, there were 
two main reasons for going with the inside-out approach. On one hand, each firm 
was lacking an explicit, across-the-board pull for solutions requiring digitization 
from the customer side. Even if the customers were interested in new ways to 
reduce their costs, not many were keen on sharing their operative data or 
participating in co-development. On the other hand, the managers’ perception – 
particularly at the top management level – that digitization was something 
important to embark on enabled and necessitated investing in capability building 
anyways. 
“No-one is asking for this. - - They are used to doing certain things, which they have always 
done. So your job is to surprise them, with things that make lives much easier to them.” –CEO, 
Bothnia 
“So we started adding, sensoring and monitoring capabilities as a more of a standard, in our 
equipment. Even though the customer wouldn’t necessarily require them.” –Chief Digital 
Officer, Newland 
“The customers are actually in a very passive role right now. They have let us collect and utilize 
data. They are waiting and seeing what is to come, they haven’t joined the development yet and 
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they don’t really even have the desire to join. And some customers don’t even want to give the 
data.” –Vice President, business line, Tammer 
A common feature across many interviews was the trust or expectation that the 
right opportunities would become revealed over the course of capability building. 
Because capability building was understood essentially as a learning process, the 
respondents believed that the increased knowledge about the potential of 
technical, human, and organizational capabilities would enable them as 
organizations to understand which opportunities were feasible and had the most 
potential. 
“There we have a huge work before the data is in the format that can be used for providing 
digital services, if it’s spare parts or if it’s remote[ly] helping the customer, finding the problems 
or whatever. - - But I think that this is the homework we need to do really to be able to provide 
these digital services.” –President, business area, Tammer 
“There are different types of approaches, a little bit different kind of business models that 
actually are enabled very much by this kind of technology. When we are able to monitor the 
equipment, continuously, we know what's happening, how the customer is using those, of course 
that leads to, quite obvious thinking, that we could actually sell this, whole product and services 
package a little bit differently, as Rolls-Royce for example has done for a long time already 
selling hours, operating hours instead of motors. - - Of course if we look at the, our - - high-
volume products, then you can think what's the value of this remote connection and so forth but 
of course for us it gives a lot of information about the product. - - But that's only internal benefits. 
For the customer of course we have been, what we have done is we developed these, portals 
where all this data. - - This is, I think very convenient for the customers to see everything in one 
location, one portal. You have visibility to all equipment so this kind of solutions are valuable. 
But still, how much money they're willing to invest on that is a question mark.” –Program 
Manager, digitization initiatives, Newland 
The most salient area in which each of the case firms had ongoing initiatives – 
albeit in different stages – was the development of the capability to monitor and 
collect performance and condition data of the installed equipment on the field 
and make reasonable and actionable analyses of it in large scale. The approach to 
achieve this was also fundamentally similar: consolidation of information, human 
resources, and initiatives with the anticipation that the combinations could yield 
new value-creating opportunities. All the firms were working on to consolidate 
their existing corporate IT systems (e.g. ERP and CRM) as well as the new data 
platforms for the collected equipment data in order to have centralized and 
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harmonized data storages. Also, the various development initiatives that were 
aiming to the realization of new human or organizational capabilities were to a 
large extent consolidated in all the firms. 
The consolidation styles varied between the case firms. In Tammer, digitization 
initiative implementation was not centralized into any special venture unit but 
was carried out in the business lines. Nonetheless, one business area and 
especially one of its business lines were the de facto spearhead units for 
digitization. 
“Then, additionally, [this business line] is a sort of a specialty for us. A specialty in the sense that 
we have the [other] machine product lines and then [this] product line, which arches over all the 
other product lines. And at the same time spreads across other divisions as well. We need to 
consider [this area of operations] from the entire business area’s point of view. We need to try 
to integrate and align the initiatives that are done also in other units of this business area to 
[this area of operations]. [This area of operations] is the spearhead and the investment for the 
future of this business area.” –Vice President, business line, Tammer 
At the business-area-level, the digitization initiatives, both external and internal, 
were prioritized and aligned by the middle and top managers with a specific 
digitization roadmap. There was also a business area support function which was 
ideating and scanning the organization for new customer-oriented solution ideas, 
and facilitated idea reviews to business area managers. However, this function 
had no resources to implement the initiatives itself, and the function’s task was 
by definition to focus on externally directed initiatives, not internally-oriented 
ones. Among the middle managers, it was considered equally important to 
digitize the internal processes and harmonize the IT infrastructure as to launch 
initiatives pursuing new opportunities. At the level of technical capabilities, 
Tammer’s objective was to create a flexible and robust data platform which would 
integrate data from different types of machines, thus creating a more complete 
understanding of the customers’ processes. 
“We are working on to build a data management and collection platform that would enable us 
to collect data from different sources and convert it into an easily analyzable format.” –Director, 
research team, Tammer 
”And in big data, there’s one ambitious challenge for us: as [this business area] is after all the 
only business in the world that has access to data and in-house understanding from all the 
possible physical equipment to operating systems [used by the customer segment]. - - No other 
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firm has it. We have the whole chain, from the very grassroots-level [machines] to the high-level 
systems. The utilization of that, in my opinion, is the big goal. And there we will eventually find 
the business opportunities.” –Vice President, business line, Tammer 
In Newland, there was no special unit dedicated only to digitization initiatives 
either. Instead, there were top-down cascading digitization strategies and 
programs that were headed by a top management team member, reached across 
all the business areas, and encompassed both internally and externally oriented 
initiatives, such as the harmonization of the firm’s internal IT systems and new 
customer-oriented initiatives. Still, the early-stage research and development 
work needed for novel digitization initiatives was done centrally in the separated 
research and development units which served the entire range of Newland’s 
business lines, but all the R&D work was not exclusively related to just 
digitization. For historical reasons, Newland’s data analytics resources – basically 
skilled data scientists – were organizationally part of the corporate research unit 
although their daily work was already to a large extent support to the ongoing 
businesses. Some respondents considered that the consolidation path with the 
analytics capability was almost finished and anticipated that the resources might 
be decentralized in the near future. 
“It's a good approach to really start from something where you, have a selected team for doing 
different cases so they start to learn and also we see what are really the opportunities that we 
have with the data that we have, and what we are also lacking data for example, or where we 
are lacking in those links between machines and services and spare parts. So I think we have a 
good approach. This will work probably, for this year maybe next year but then we have to 
really consider this, should we have those people in the business lines.” –Program Manager, 
digitization initiatives, Newland 
Alike in Tammer, also in Bothnia one business area was clearly the spearhead unit 
for building the digitization capabilities. As a key difference, Bothnia had 
established a new unit within the business line into which the various 
development initiatives and staff were consolidated. Besides avoiding overlap of 
initiatives and poor alignment among them, the consolidation was also in Bothnia 
expected to spur new innovative ideas. 
“So, first of all, we are of course listening to our customers and, trying to get feedback from 
them. But also trying to be innovative and trying to think about solutions which the customer 
don't even know that he needs. And trying to really think out of the box. This is a real drive in 
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the new organization that we now have that we are looking to be innovative and we are looking 
to develop new, solutions which, preferably nobody else has in the marketplace. - - We had 
several products but they were developed in several different parts of the company. And we had, 
projects ongoing but they were not coordinated. There were this digitalization and, the need for 
more services in this area made it evident that we need to have a dedicated team or organization 
to do these things. - - We need to streamline that and we need to work together so that it is one 
solution because, God forbid, we can't have many different solutions in the same area.” –General 
Manager, venture unit, Bothnia 
In addition, Newland and Bothnia were pursuing to consolidate the 
functionalities of the numerous old customer-facing systems into single 
interfaces, ‘one-stop-shop’ customer portals. This was already a clear step 
towards searching opportunities with the established capabilities but still without 
certainty of direct, explicit business benefits. Both firms believed that the single 
interface would improve customer experience, because all the old functionalities 
and information – extended with lots of new – were provided via a more modern, 
device-independent portal, but the portals as such were not expected to generate 
new revenue besides possibly more active spare part sales.  
“Yeah, naturally, we always had, let's say quite a long time we've had different kinds of portals 
for us, for example, selling spare parts or whatever. But, now it's more or less like this whole 
idea of [the portal] is to bring it all together, like all the relevant information for the customers. 
And, build a good customer experience so to say, so that we don't have this like scattered around 
systems where customers tend to get lost, but we have only one place where you log in, you get 
all the relevant info from there and there you go, basically. - - It's only like, they want to have 
one place where they go and get everything from there. So, they want it to be simple so that we 
want to lower their, let's say the bar to do business with us in a digital way as low as possible so 
that it's like something that you could do every day.” –General Manager, industrial internet and 
service development, Newland 
 “For example, these online services that customer is able to see, all relevant information about 
their assets and alike.  It's available for them in a portal.” –Director, venture unit, Bothnia 
“So you have this portal for everything that is related to Bothnia. So when we do this will help 
the customers to say that, it's easy to work with you. That's the important thing. The second 
thing is it really offloads, our organization, in this part.” –CEO, Bothnia 
On the contrary, Tammer was not yet planning to create similar portals but 
wanted to focus on building the substance knowledge and capabilities first. 
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“We can build the interfaces, fancy looking interfaces and make a lot of fuss and noise in the 
marketplace but if there is no substance behind the interface it doesn’t take us very far.” –
President, business area, Tammer 
Although the approaches to inside-out capability building resembled each other 
in all the firms, the degree of specificity to which the capabilities were defined as 
well as the perception of what it would take to build them, however, differed 
across the case firms. For instance, Newland had already established a remote 
monitoring capability and had also the data analytics capability in-house. 
Because the firm had taken steps to ‘boost’ the capability building by adding 
sensors and connectivity as a standard already since 2010, there had been a lot of 
data for the data analysts to work on with. As a result, a lot of the data analysts’ 
daily work was supporting business lines in requests and not only innovating 
possible uses. Here, the inside-out-built capabilities were indeed used to capture 
new opportunities. 
“But in a way we have resources for this and of course how we are doing is that we, together 
with our business we specify the analytics case studies or so forth. We are discussing with the 
business what could be the most valuable thing to do with this data that we're able to gather. 
Then we specify the projects and then our guys are working together with the business so that, 
we get to the results as required. This is something we are doing, now. - - Now these [analysts] 
are in the research organization but of course they are supporting directly the business.” –
Program Manager, digitization initiatives, Newland 
In Bothnia, various remote monitoring technologies had been in place since the 
early 2000s and the firm also had a rather long history with building the data 
analytics capability. The data had been analyzed with old employees without 
specific data analysis training until 2010, when Bothnia hired its first actual data 
scientists from the outside of the firm. However, their lack of understanding 
about the engineering and performance of the equipment led first into challenges, 
as they were not able to evaluate whether their analysis results were truly valid, 
not to mention to create proactively recommendations to equipment engineering 
and maintenance. 
“So, the impossible mix of good business and engine knowledge combined with IT knowledge, 
software development knowledge… There are not that many of those in the marketplace.” –
General Manager, venture unit, Bothnia 
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“But we said, we realized that, to make different kind of a sense out of this information, we need 
some different kind of a competence. That’s why this handful of these [mathematicians] were 
hired. They really didn’t know anything about our technology or our equipment as such.” –
Director, venture unit, Bothnia 
Because such talent was found to be rare or inexistent, Bothnia had decided to 
solve the problem by setting up an in-house training program which trained a 
new breed of data analysts out of recently recruited university graduates. 
Moreover, the general approach at Bothnia appeared to be that the capability 
building, and opportunity identification, can always be boosted if the status quo 
is not satisfactory. 
In Tammer, which had started the building the analytics capability as the last one 
of the firms, the degree of specificity in capability definition was the lowest. 
Tammer’s managers considered that they were taking their first steps in the 
process of learning to understand the needed capabilities, let alone the 
opportunities. Alike in the two other firms, Tammer’s managers also thought that 
‘hybrid’ human talent was needed but the firm itself was in the stage of figuring 
out how to develop or acquire it. In contrast to especially Bothnia, the managerial 
perception was that the learning process would take its time and could not be 
accelerated beyond a certain limit. 
“We want to understand this ourselves. It just takes its time to build the understanding. 
Parallelizing may work to a certain point but it doesn’t help beyond that, because it’s not enough 
that only the five people working directly with the initiative understand it. Also the next level 
and even the level after that need to understand it well enough. It just takes a certain time to get 
it done.” –Vice President, business line, Tammer 
4.3 Outside-in focus on defining opportunities before building 
capabilities 
Outside-in focus is the opposite approach to inside-out. In outside-in approach, 
managers focus first on searching potential opportunities which are then 
matched with existing capabilities or by building new ones, in case a capability 
gap is perceived. Again, outside-in approach is also an idealization of an extreme 
case and thus unlikely to be found as such from real-life cases. (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2013) Still, Eggers and Kaplan (2013) suggest that entrepreneurs’ approaches 
may be closer to outside-in than inside-out sequencing.  
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Even though the matching in the case firms had happened predominantly inside-
out, this focus would not have been possible without defining the opportunities 
at least at some level before that. Hence, while the actual ongoing development 
projects were mainly focused on capability building without certainty about the 
exact future opportunities, at least a vision about the business benefits existed in 
all the cases. Most commonly referred benefits were cost savings through more 
efficient processes, distinguishing from existing competitors with better quality 
and speed, and providing value-added services based on the expertise gained 
from analyzing data. However, the more concrete business models, offerings, and 
for example pricing decisions were still very much undefined, because a strong 
customer demand did not seem to exist for the new services types yet. 
“This goes in three waves. In the first wave, we will benefit ourselves by understanding better 
and knowing how to make things more efficiently. Then, in the second wave, we need to increase 
our costs when we build the analysis capability and the business on top of it, which means that 
we will invest in people and devices and systems and ways of working. And the third wave is 
when it will start to generate business benefit, that is, top line. The first stage will decrease costs 
and the second stage will increase costs, and the third one will bring more revenues. - - 2 + 2 + 
2 [years], that is my own rough estimate of how long each wave will take.” –Vice President, 
business line, Tammer 
Still, especially business case proposals – defined more or less specifically – were 
reported as an important initiative selection criteria in all the firms. In Tammer’s 
case, the data platform initiative was clearly done inside-out. In the current stage, 
a team of research employees were solving the technical solutions for data 
collection, transfer, and storage, and analytics capability building was also on the 
list before the realization of the so far unspecified new services. However, even in 
this case, a broad description of the business benefits had been a critical factor 
for the initiative to proceed into implementation. The roots of the platform 
initiative had been in the prior big data initiative which never proceeded into 
execution because the envisioned opportunities were considered too abstractly 
defined for Tammer’s needs. As a result, the initiative was never prioritized high 
enough against the initiatives with more concrete opportunity definitions, such 
as Tammer’s large project deliveries for which the customer demand, 
opportunity, was explicit. 
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“It was a kind of a theoretical top management initiative, an island, a group effort I would say 
that the line organization never adopted as being important. So it was a kind of internal 
communication thing and it started a bit to live its own life.” –President, business area, Tammer 
“The biggest reason was that the vision, the nice picture of what it could be was painted but we 
didn’t understand what kind of tricks and steps would have been needed in the implementation 
in the case of our organization and scale. The references that were used were big corporations 
like Dell and often from consumer business world. Those references were not exactly right if you 
think about our volumes and needs and that a machine like ours is a bit different.” –Director, 
research team, Tammer 
When the idea was picked up again and redefined as the platform initiative as a 
result of top-down change in the firm’s strategic context, the assigned business 
owner helped make a business case proposal for the initiative and helped secure 
the implementation resources. A well-prepared business case proposal was 
mandatory for any initiative to get approval in Tammer, because the initiative 
flow and resource allocation process were mainly bottom-up, with only very 
seldom direct top-down interventions by the top management. Nevertheless, the 
business case for the platform did not need to be a meticulously quantified 
forecast, but rather a description of what kind of new opportunities the platform 
could open put on timeline. 
“Every initiative where I put money to must have a business analysis behind it, a description of 
the business case: ‘if we do this, what could it mean?’ Not a single initiative will be launched 
where I don’t see the benefit for the business. - - There’s no general time limit that the initiative 
would have to pay itself back in a year, the payback can be in two years or three or five years. 
It just needs to be there. - - The business case can’t of course be a detailed, accurate forecast if 
we expect it to sell something in two years from now. But for instance in an initiative like the 
platform development must describe what services it will enable. The services it will enable, then 
the gains from those services – all that must be thought about and described.” –Vice President, 
business line, Tammer 
The planned business cases were also not necessarily rigidly held on to if the 
perceptions changed. For instance, the platform project was launched with an 
outside-in opportunity in mind, but the development order was quickly reversed 
to inside-out as the middle management perceived that Tammer did not yet 
possess the capabilities to sell and provide the ideated service. 
“First we had a certain service business as a priority. I don’t mean a service like equipment 
maintenance but service business built around an IT system – that we thought would be the first 
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step. But we’ve moved that to a later stage because that is actually the fifth step, and the four 
other steps we’ve been missing. That’s why I postponed it, so that we won’t yet start thinking 
about and selling this, optimization and analytics, when we haven’t got the building blocks with 
which to do it. Now the starting point is rather, well, the four steps and what we can do already 
now with our existing capabilities.” –Vice President, business line, Tammer 
All in all, although some pilot customer feedback and requirement lists were used 
in the platform research work, Tammer’s approach did not, at least in this stage, 
include co-development with the customers. 
In Newland, the whole discovery and establishment of digitization as a strategic 
theme was originally outside-in. The starting point had been the 
acknowledgement that, for certain customers, the equipment provided or 
serviced by Newland were a critical part of their business processes. Because the 
downtime cost of these pieces of equipment was very high, Newland interpreted 
that this customer need required higher responsiveness and higher level of the 
expertise from Newland’s maintenance services. 
“But when you really go into more demanding application areas - - or when you are getting 
more and more concerned about the uptime or the safety of the operation itself. Then we go into 
areas where you can improve the performance of the equipment quite a bit, with the inbuilt 
intelligence in the [machine]. And when you look at the top segment of the equipment, then that 
is something that can provide you with additional competitive advantage. In those application 
areas where customers are more concerned about the safety, or the high uptime of the 
equipment.” –Chief Digital Officer, Newland 
Moreover, remote monitoring, data analytics, and more easily accessible, 
integrated customer and product databases were interpreted as capabilities that 
would enable Newland capture the opportunity, while simultaneously reducing 
the cost by increasing Newland’s own internal efficiency. Similar thinking was 
behind the customer portal initiative: responsiveness and accuracy become even 
higher when customers can actually serve themselves and place for instance spare 
part orders directly. However, as such the portal did not increase Newland’s 
revenues since there was no extra charge for it – rather, the differentiating and 
possibly locking-in effects, added sales, as well the internal cost savings formed 
the opportunity. 
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The dilemma at Newland was that the opportunities were more visible in the 
segment of customers with the high uptime need. However, these customers 
formed only a minority of Newland’s total customer base: for the largest segment, 
the specific equipment sold or serviced by Newland was less critical for running 
the operations, which correlated directly with a lower demand for more advanced 
services or products. In this segment, Newland’s approach had been heavily 
inside-out focused, driven by the vision and perception of importance of the top 
management. Although Newland had been trying to picture the opportunity as 
e.g. improved safety and productivity for these customers, the opportunity as 
such did not seem to have realized yet. As a consequence, Newland appeared to 
be redefining the opportunity instead as higher internal efficiency, converting the 
new information into knowledge in new product development, evidently resulting 
in competitive advantages for the firm. 
 “So all these things that we are able to create with the added sensory with the added, intelligence 
onto the [machine], only address to a certain small segment of our customers. Then there’s the 
wide segment of general - - customers or customers that are using [machines] in not so critical 
areas, where all the same benefits apply but the equipment itself is not that critical of a piece of 
equipment in the customer’s process. So it makes it a bit more challenging to start than, selling 
the value of these additional features and functionalities to customers. But where you clearly see 
that value does exist, is in the capabilities of maintaining and supporting the crane.” –Chief 
Digital Officer, Newland 
Bothnia’s steps with remote monitoring and data platform development 
resembled those of Newland. Also in Bothnia’s case, the first input came from the 
customer business. However, the business opportunity was perhaps less explicitly 
stated than in Newland’s case: Bothnia understood that their customers would 
benefit from faster, better and more accurate maintenance service as well as new 
ways to optimize their operations, although at least some of them hesitated the 
allowing the remote data collection and analysis. 
“In [our customer] industry, it boils down to, in the cost saving era as we have, it matters 
optimizing everything you're doing. - - For us, when we do our service part we have to connect 
ourselves to that and say that, for us it's important to know that if a [machine] is going to be 
serviced, something wrong with [a certain component] and so we have to find out that at the 
right time so - - we can be there with the right spare part and knowing exactly what to do. - - 
The challenge we've had in this area is, maybe not doing it because we've done it for many years 
but, the more difficult is to get our customers to adopt to this, meaning that they should, let us 
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monitor their [equipment] and then buy the services that we are doing. It's a very conservative 
business that we are in, meaning that they feel that ‘why should someone else look at our…, we 
can do it ourselves while we are operating’.” –CEO, Bothnia 
Furthermore, Bothnia seemed to be taking steps toward a higher level of 
customer-centricity, taking deliberately steps from inside-out to more outside-in 
matching of opportunities and capabilities. The interviewees emphasized that for 
the new initiatives, internal efficiency improvement alone was no longer enough 
to qualify as a selection criterion. Instead, any new initiative that was about 
receive resources needed to demonstrate a business case estimate of how the 
initiative would add value to the customer. The reason for this development was 
that over the past 10–15 years, Bothnia had developed over a hundred 
applications for different purposes, including both internal efficiency 
improvement and new customer value-adding features. Bothnia had 
acknowledged that many of the applications had not performed as well as the 
original business case proposals had implied. In addition, the development and 
maintenance of a non-harmonized set of applications was considered too costly. 
“If you take all the business cases during the past ten fifteen years when we have started some 
application, we should be making money like bandits. If we really calculate that how much we… 
We don’t have that much cost what we should have saved.” –Director, venture unit, Bothnia 
In addition, Bothnia was also building an online portal which would form a single 
interface for the customers. It was a central part of Bothnia’s overall program for 
creating mass-customized services and solutions. The service model change as a 
whole and the portal development work were very much outside-in: for instance, 
the platform building was preceded by an extensive customer survey, in which 
the customers were asked to prioritize the most important services to them. Based 
on this information, Bothnia focused its efforts on building especially those 
capabilities that were needed to deliver or improve the top 3–5 needs. The mass-
customized service model and portal included certain basic services with the 
normal charge, on top of which customers could acquire further add-on services 
according to their needs. 
“What we want to achieve is flexibility. So based on our customers’ demand on a service level so 
we want to create flexibility there. So if a customer wants basic services so they can get that. 
That is called core services. So it’s a free-of-charge service level to all customers. Or if they want 
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to buy certain type of more advanced services then we have created these advanced services. So 
it’s a little bit like flying tourist class or business class on airplane.” –Director, business area 
development, Bothnia 
Furthermore, out of all the three firms, Bothnia was the most active in co-creating 
new solutions together with their customers. Although Newland and Tammer 
were also carrying out their initiatives first with pilot customers, in Bothnia the 
interaction and iterations with the customers seemed to be the most advanced. It 
was for instance using mock-up versions of the services in the early stage of 
customer engagement to test which features were valuable and which were not, 
hence validating quickly the ideated opportunities and capability needs 
“When we do a new development, we want to do a proof of concept together with the customer 
as soon as possible, at most in couple of months so that when we come to the market, we know 
that this is actually what the customer wants. - - When we have a new service in mind we will 
make a mockup or a demo version. Then we will take a customer and show him this mockup and 
let him interact with it, see how it works, ask for their suggestions. And then see how we can 
improve the concept. We will do it with several customers and then we will take it to 
development. If they don’t like it, we don’t develop it. It is better to fail quickly.” –General 
Manager, venture unit product development, Bothnia 
Overall, the approach was following to a great extent the lean startup method 
(Ries, 2011). The finding from Bothnia also gives slight support to Eggers and 
Kaplan’s (2013) suggestion that more entrepreneurial firms would be more likely 
to use outside-in sequence in the matching process, although it is evident that all 
the three case firms were represented strong incumbent industry players. 
4.4 Iterative definition and refinement of opportunities and 
capabilities 
Dividing the sequence of the matching process into a dichotomy between inside-
out and outside-in is theoretically convenient but may not be accurate in reality 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). Eggers and Kaplan (2013) suggest that opportunity and 
capability discovery and development could happen through experimentation, 
e.g. smaller and reversible commitments. Similar ideas have been presented for 
example Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, p. 1), who found that successful, 
continuously changing firms use “a wide variety of low-cost probes into the 
future”, and Ries (2011), who suggested that successful startups with marginal 
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resources identify and develop opportunities and capabilities through rapid 
iterations. 
The findings of this study also suggest that the sequencing is in reality more 
ambiguous. Sequencing seemed to take turns between inside-out and outside-in 
iteratively. The definition efforts focused on the opportunities or the capabilities 
depending on whichever part was more uncertain. For example in Tammer, 
focusing almost exclusively on capability building became possible only after the 
too visionary opportunities were reassessed and put into a format of a business 
case proposal which still was rather directional plan than a forecast. 
Besides that, all the firms were trying to promote experimentation and become 
more agile in the matching. Bothnia was in some areas the most advanced firm, 
co-creating new services with the customers by building early mock-up versions 
of new service concepts for early validation of potential business opportunities 
and capability requirements. The experimentation-based approach had not been 
one of Bothnia’s existing capabilities, but one that had been built specifically for 
the service development. Bothnia’s traditional product development had been 
very different due to the equipment’s large size and technical complexity: because 
of the much higher cost of prototyping, these projects had been more strictly 
defined from the start. 
Newland was also launching its new services by first piloting them with certain 
lead customers, but in Newland’s case the customers’ readiness to participate in 
co-development appeared to vary across the customer segment, with the small, 
‘advanced’ customer segment being more open to co-operation than the large 
customer segment coping with more standardized services and equipment. In 
Tammer, the customers seemed to be the least involved in initiatives that were 
still in the research and development stage, but the requirements and 
specification templates from some lead customers formed the basis for capability 
development there as well. On the other hand, Tammer’s in-house software 
development applied agile development methods and took benchmarks from the 
software industry, not from the software development departments of peer 
industrial companies. Overall, Tammer was deliberately trying to change the 
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company culture to promote more experimentation and expressing and listening 
to diverse opinions more openly. 
As a difference between the firms, the speed and length of the iterations varied 
greatly. The intervals and duration seemed to depend at least on the managers’ 
sense of urgency which was partly driven by threat perceptions, managerial 
commitment, and availability of customers who were interested in participating 
the co-development. Both attributes could be linked to the overall stage in which 
the respective firm was with the capability building and opportunity refinement. 
In Tammer, the capability building in research did not seem to be rushed: the 
managerial perception was that it was foremost a learning process which would 
just take its time. This initiative was still in the early research stage and market 
pull for having that capability in place was so far weak: in the case of all the firms, 
the customer industries were described as highly cost-sensitive, implying 
demonstrating at least some results was necessary for spurring market demand 
to emerge. 
In Bothnia, on the other hand, the iterations were rapid and done together with 
customers. In comparison to Tammer, Bothnia was in a further stage in the 
refinement and establishment of capabilities and opportunities: it had already 
working technical solutions for data collection as well as in-house capability to 
analyze the data with which it was able to demonstrate results to otherwise 
doubtful customers. Importantly, the interviewed top managers expressed a great 
sense of urgency to accelerate the iterations. The talks about “survival game” and 
the “need to stay on the leading edge” explained why they were not satisfied with 
serving only the explicitly stated customer demand, but wanted to innovate also 
solutions for which no demand necessarily existed yet. Top management 
commitment was described as the decisive prerequisite for following the 
accelerated pace: 
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Table 4.2. Opportunity and capability development stages of the cases firms. 
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 “I think it is important that the high level of management is committed to agile ways of working. 
We are used to traditional waterfall-based approach where we have a tight project plan, hard 
business case, people who don’t like to embrace change, but the good thing that the decisions to 
pursue agile development has come from the top, and now it is important that when we are 
implementing it, everybody understand what it actually means. There is quite a lot of benefits. 
The whole company needs to become agile as a way to deal with uncertainty. - - What we are 
doing now, we could have done it earlier but it was not our strategy.” –General Manager, 
product development in venture unit, Bothnia 
Based on these findings, the first proposition is stated as follows: 
Proposition 1. Opportunities and capabilities are refined and matched 
together in an iterative process, where the sequence of matching alternates 
between outside-in and inside-out. 
Furthermore, the length and speed of iterations can vary depending at least on 
the stage of development and on how managers perceive and balance the urgency 
and ‘natural time requirement’ for learning. Based on the limited data from the 
three case firms, it also appears that the speed of iterations can accelerate over 
time as both opportunities and capabilities become validated and refined to a 
greater level of detail. Table 4.2 describes the broad development stages in the 
firms. 
4.5 Effect of managerial commitment on the pattern of the matching 
The prior literature on managerial cognition has shown that the managerial 
attention, especially in the top management level, affects what opportunities are 
perceived the most attractive and which capabilities are needed. Furthermore, 
the managerial attention guides the organization to build the needed capabilities 
if the organization does not yet possess them. (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Laamanen 
& Wallin, 2009) Eggers and Kaplan (2013) have suggested that the opportunities 
and capabilities are interpreted and fit together in a matching process. However, 
the sequence of the matching process, i.e., which does the organization focus on 
defining first, the opportunities or the capabilities, has not been fully understood. 
Based on the data, it seems that the level of managerial commitment has a 
decisive effect on the pattern of the matching process. First of all, in Tammer, the 
initiatives were defined and selected mainly in a bottom-up process, where the 
business areas were rather autonomous and the corporate management exercised 
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its power by making high-level resource allocation decisions. As a result of the 
decentralized definition and selection, managerial commitment was built 
upwards step by step. For an initiative to pass through the intra-firm selection, it 
needed to be based on a solid argumentation. Business case calculations and 
presentations were a mandatory selection criterion and the prioritization tool for 
managers at any level. This kind of a process favored initiatives with clearly stated 
business opportunities and capability requirements. For digitization initiatives, 
which were novel to both Tammer and its customers, demonstrating the benefits 
concretely in advance was challenging, and, as an outcome, the early digitization 
initiatives were not prioritized above more ‘proximate’ initiatives. Because the top 
management relied more on influencing the bottom-up process indirectly by 
modifying the strategic and structural contexts instead of making interventions, 
the commitment to launching uncertain digitization initiatives remained low. 
Therefore, the low managerial commitment to any specific type of initiatives, 
such as digitization, favored initiatives where the opportunities were more 
certain. 
Newland and Bothnia, on the contrary, had much more top-down oriented 
digitization strategies instead of the bottom-up definition and selection of 
initiatives. Both firms had started building new digitization capabilities and 
experimenting with new types of services earlier than Tammer, and although the 
opportunities and capabilities were defined on a more detailed level, the 
capability building and especially the work to convert the new opportunities into 
quantified business benefits was still in progress. In Newland and Bothnia, the 
strong top management commitment had been the critical enabler for the 
digitization initiatives where the opportunities were more uncertain. Starting 
from the CEOs, there was a strong conviction in both firms that the investments 
in building digitization capabilities would eventually pay back in the form of new 
opportunities, which at the time of investment decision could have been only on 
the level of a vision. The top management commitment mobilized organizational 
action despite the uncertainty by giving a clear direction. For instance in 
Newland, an explicit, quantified and measurable target was set for the capability 
building in a situation where setting sales or cost saving targets were not yet 
reasonable. Finally, also in Tammer the launch of digitization initiatives became 
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possible after the top management made the decision to make digitization a 
strategic priority for the firm, thus enabling initiatives focusing first on capability 
building. In sum, the strong managerial commitment in all the firms made it 
possible to start building digitization capabilities before the opportunities were 
concretely defined. 
On the grounds of these findings showing the impact of managerial commitment 
on the matching process, I present the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. The pattern of the matching process depends on 
managerial commitment. In a high-commitment regime, capabilities are 
built before all opportunities are clear. In a low-commitment regime, 
capability building follows the clarification of opportunities. 
The managerial commitment reinforces the inside-out search of opportunities 
based on capabilities that either already exist or are built before the discovery of 
the opportunities. Consequently, higher managerial commitment reduces the 
likelihood of outside-in-directed assembly of capabilities based on identified 
opportunities. Subsequent matches result in outcomes that may be related to for 
example the operative, financial, or strategic performance of the organization. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
The findings of this research extend the understanding about how an 
organization’s strategy process and managerial cognitions of capabilities and 
opportunities affect and shape each other as the organization responds to a 
technological discontinuity. A discontinuity, like the industrial internet in case of 
the manufacturing firms, can have such a broad definition that defining which 
opportunities and capabilities are the right ones is not self-evident. In order to 
reduce the uncertainty, organizations engage in a matching process where the 
opportunities and capabilities are refined. 
My findings suggest that the pattern of the matching process is iterative in nature 
and that the managerial commitment has an influence on it. The two propositions 
and their mutual interconnection are presented schematically in figure 5.1. 
Proposition 1 (P1) suggests that the sequence of matching takes turns over time 
between inside-out search of opportunities based on existing capabilities and 
outside-in assembly of capabilities based on identified opportunities. The 
uncertainty brought about by the technological discontinuity is gradually 
resolved over the iterations as the definitions of opportunities and capabilities are 
refined. 
Proposition 2 (P2) states that the managerial commitment affects which 
matching pattern – inside-out search or outside-in assembly – prevails at a 
certain time period. When the managerial commitment to pursue certain 
opportunities or capabilities is low, it is likely that the opportunities need to 
become more clearly visible before investing resources and time in capability 
building takes place. Based on the interview data, the low commitment towards a 
new area like the industrial internet is caused by the uncertainty or, rather, 
abstractness of the envisioned opportunities. If the managers have other options 
on the table with more concretely specified opportunities and capability needs, 
those options will likely be prioritized higher in the resource allocation. In this 
kind of a regime, the opportunities need to be refined and specified better before 
investing in capability building becomes possible. On the other hand, when the 
managerial commitment is high, the organization can being to invest time and 
other resources in capability building even before all the opportunities are clear. 
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The high commitment from especially the top management can ward off possible 
competing cognitive frames and show direction to the organization, thus 
resolving uncertainty. 
Finally, the opportunity-capability matches result in outcomes which are 
considered more or less successful, affecting the managerial commitment and 
forming a recursive loop back to the matching process. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. The influence of managerial commitment on the iterative matching 
process. 
5.1 Implications to the resource allocation process theory 
The idea of iterative resource allocation to initiatives as the core of strategy 
making is the prevalent idea in the resource allocation process theory (e.g. Bower, 
1970; Burgelman, 1983; Noda & Bower, 1996). The findings of my thesis are 
aligned with the theory, but also extend it by highlighting more the role of 
managerial cognition to the process. 
In general, a large extent of the resource allocation process literature appears to 
presume that strategy making is mostly bottom-up (e.g. Bower & Gilbert, 2005; 
Burgelman, 1983). According to my findings, the managerial cognition has a 
significant effect on whether an organization’s strategy making relies on the 
bottom-up process or is characterized by top-down interventions. My data 
suggests that top managers who rely on a portfolio management approach may 
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commit less to individual initiatives and rather let the intra-firm selection 
environment (as coined by Burgelman (2005)) take care of sorting out the best 
initiatives. Rather, these top managers can opt for influencing the definition and 
selection of new bottom-up initiatives indirectly, for instance by altering the 
strategic context of the firm. In Tammer, the corporate management set the 
strategic themes and performance targets to the business areas, which however 
composed their strategy proposals autonomously and bottom-up. 
In contrast, high top management commitment to pursue certain opportunities 
or capabilities can lead to a top management intervention and deviation from the 
bottom-up process, if the process does not generate satisfactory initiatives (e.g. 
Eisenmann & Bower, 2000; Raynor, 2005). In both Newland and Bothnia, the 
industrial internet initiatives were spearhead initiatives in broader digitization 
programs or strategies that were coordinated and managed more directly by the 
top management. Indirect means – changes in the strategic and also the 
structural context of the firm – were also used to demonstrate the commitment. 
Differences in the managerial threat and opportunity perceptions as well as the 
sense of urgency to take action could explain the difference in the strategy making 
patterns. If the technological discontinuity is not considered immediately 
disruptive but rather something that starts to have bigger implications only after 
some years, the managers can be comfortable with moving the organization 
slowly towards the new paradigm more discreetly through embedding new 
concepts to the organization’s strategic context. In Tammer, a recurring view 
among middle and operating managers was that there was not that much novelty 
in the industrial internet as such. Rather, it was seen as a logical continuation of 
the prior automation technology solutions. More radical implications to the 
business were expected eventually, but the perception was that there would not 
be any groundbreaking innovations coming out in the industry in the next 4–5 
years. In the top management, the perception was also that no radical change 
would happen overnight, but that it was important to start moving already now 
because the organization was so slow to change: 
“Probably whatever we do now, since we are not… by nature, we are not the fastest company in 
the world, we are very traditional, whatever we do now we are probably too slow anyway so 
it’s very difficult to over-invest or overreact.” –President, business area, Tammer 
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In Newland and Bothnia, the perceptions about the discontinuity were different. 
Newland had been investing in building capabilities for years and digitization had 
been vocally incorporated in the official strategy before peer companies: Newland 
wanted to be a shaper in the industry, advancing the emergence of the 
discontinuity. A top-down strategy fit this logic well. In Bothnia, the dominant 
impression was that unless they were the leaders, they would not survive against 
the competition. Due to this threat perception, Bothnia wanted to be attentive to 
customer needs but also to surpass them by innovating unforeseen offerings 
proactively. Also here, an actively managed top-down strategy was considered the 
best. 
From the theoretical perspective, the superiority of either pattern of strategy 
making is not universal but situational. Bottom-up definition and selection of 
initiatives can be a good approach for organizational renewal if the change indeed 
is not too radical. The decentralized, autonomous initiative definition takes 
advantage of the different individual perceptions within the organization, thus 
increasing the sensitivity to such subtle changes in the environment which might 
be easily overlooked by the top management alone (Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). 
However, if the discontinuity is truly disruptive and requires a rapid 
reconfiguration of the organization’s resources and capabilities, the top managers 
are in the best position to direct the changes: because they typically have rich 
connections outside the firm and are informed about all the business units’ 
resources and capabilities, they should be the most knowledgeable about what 
radical actions are required by the radical changes (Raynor, 2005). Strong 
commitment by the top management to their interpreted match helps also resolve 
the uncertainty caused by potential competing cognitive frames (Kaplan, 2008). 
In conclusion, the applicability of either bottom-up or top-down strategy making 
depends on whether an organization’s prevailing managerial cognition about the 
nature of discontinuity is accurate or not. 
5.2 Implications to the managerial cognition theory 
In their paper about capability cognition, Eggers and Kaplan (2013) called out for 
more research on how the matching of capabilities and opportunities actually 
happens in firms. My findings suggest that strategic initiatives act as an 
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important vehicle for the matching, because initiatives entail an idea of both the 
benefits it would yield and the capabilities and resources which would be needed 
to realize those benefits. In other words, initiatives encompass new opportunity-
capability matches. Hence, when aggregated to the scale of the entire 
organization, the implemented initiatives do not only constitute the realized 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1978), but also form the organization-level interpretation of 
the opportunity-capability matches. 
In my framework, the role of perceived outcomes is important. According to Noda 
and Bower (1996), resources are allocated iteratively to initiatives that are 
perceived as successful: the success of an initiative is not measured objectively, 
but it is always relative to the expectations and aspirations. Therefore, two 
initiatives that generate similar early results may be set off to completely different 
development trajectories, if for one the performance is above the early 
expectations and for the other the same performance is deemed disappointing. 
The examples from the case firms reinforce this interpretation. In Newland, the 
early success with the remote monitoring systems in one customer segment 
appeared to have reinforced the top managers’ commitment to continue 
investments in building the capabilities further despite some doubts about the 
business potential. In contrast in Tammer, the first big data proposals were 
obviously not perceived as good enough in contrast to other initiatives with better 
business case analyses, resulting in lukewarm commitment from the middle 
managers. 
Eggers and Kaplan (2013, p. 317) also presented the idea that experimentation 
could be one way in which managers evaluate potential matches, “either through 
adopting potentially reversible courses of action or testing possible matches in 
beta or pilot form”. Based on the data, experimentation through pilot testing of 
for instance new service concepts was indeed one important way in which the 
firms carried out (or planned to carry out) the matching. Furthermore, the 
alterations between inside-out and outside-in may accelerate over the course of 
iterative refinement of opportunities and capabilities. In Tammer which was still 
very much in the early stage of defining opportunities and building capabilities 
for the industrial internet, the technological research for data platform was 
planned to take months before involving the customer in the work. In Bothnia, 
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which had proceeded to a stage where it was co-creating new service concepts 
together with their customers with the help of mock-ups, separating the iterations 
were so rapid that the validation of opportunities and needed capabilities was 
practically simultaneous. 
Finally, Eggers and Kaplan (2013) also hypothesized that incumbent firms would 
be more prone to use the inside-out approach while entrepreneurial firms would 
opt for the outside-in. Although all of the three case firms definitely belonged to 
the incumbent category in their respective industries, I found modest support to 
the suggestion. In the beginning when the upcoming potential discontinuity is 
first identified, it seems that inside-out approach and even technology push are 
needed to build some understanding about what can be done with the new 
technology and to establish a reputation as a knowledgeable player. A logical 
explanation could be that in relatively conservative and cost-sensitive business-
to-business markets, the reputational risk of approaching customers with 
premature new innovations could be too high to bear, especially when the 
customers are not accustomed to and do not themselves possess the capabilities 
for co-creation. The vendor’s capabilities and expertise need to be first on such a 
level that concrete results can be demonstrated with e.g. prior reference cases or 
pilot exercises. As both vendor and customer become more convinced about the 
specific opportunity over the iterative refinement, it becomes easier for both 
parties to commit to more entrepreneurial co-creation methods. The above-
mentioned instances from Tammer and Bothnia exemplify this logic. 
5.3 Implications to managers and other practitioners 
The findings of my thesis have two main implications to managers and one for 
the public or industry institutions organized for knowledge sharing across firms. 
First, when facing a technological discontinuity, especially the top managers need 
to evaluate the speed and radicalness of the upcoming change, and then align the 
organization’s strategy process with it. In this process, top managers need to be 
aware of the benefits and disadvantages of both bottom-up and top-down strategy 
processes in different situations. 
If the change is expected to be rapid and radical, a top-down intervention may be 
needed, because the bottom-up process may lower levels of the organization it is 
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more difficult to produce initiatives that would propose realignment of the 
organizational resources. Middle and operating managers’ personal risks and 
myopia to the opportunities, threats, and capabilities at hand in their own 
business units may effectively inhibit the generation of initiatives proposing a 
reconfiguration of the organization’s goals, capabilities, resources, and 
structures. 
On the other hand, if the discontinuity is less radical but happens instead in 
stages, the bottom-up strategy process may be a valid way to produce the right 
responses. The generation and disclosure of more autonomously-ideated, 
previously unthought-of initiatives can be fostered by increasing the variation of 
experience, skills, and working styles in the organization. A fast way to increase 
variation is to assign new managers with new perceptions in key positions, also 
from the outside of the firm and even the entire industry. At the same time, the 
top management should acknowledge that the greater variety of ideas can also 
lead to a greater number of competing interpretations of which opportunities and 
capabilities the organization should pursue. To resolve the change-resisting 
inertia and uncertainty, the bottom-up strategy process can be influenced 
indirectly to generate a certain kind of initiatives by altering the strategic and the 
structural context of the firm, or more directly by demonstrating a strong 
commitment to a certain direction. 
The second managerial implication is associated with how managers can become 
aware of the possible discontinuity and the related opportunities and capabilities 
in the first place. Based on the data, the firms that were the most advanced in 
defining and developing the specific opportunities and capabilities had 
interpreted commercial potential first in services, not equipment manufacturing 
and sales per se which after all was the original area of business of all the firms. 
The explanation could be that the services are more relationship-based whereas 
equipment sales has traditionally been transaction-based. Closer relationships 
provide more touchpoints between customer and vendor which enables faster 
feedback in both directions but also understanding better the context and 
conditions of the customer’s business. Furthermore, in services it can be easier to 
experiment with new offerings than in the traditional manufacturing. Creating 
early mock-up versions of a service concept and testing it directly with real 
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customers is relatively simple in comparison to the technological research and 
development of industrial machines. The high complexity and cost of the 
equipment – not to mention the possibly very large size of it – can make it very 
difficult and expensive to build demo versions for testing, although the 
advancement of digital simulation and 3D design and printing technologies can 
reduce the cost of experimentation as well. Nevertheless, due to the iterative 
nature of refining opportunities and capabilities, finding the optimal and 
commercially viable match can take multiple iterations. Finding ways to 
experiment early can help the organization get on the move to the right direction, 
but the experimentation can also give valuable information about the real nature 
of the technological discontinuity as a whole. 
The third practical implication concerns the institutions close to an industry 
where a technological discontinuity is expected to happen or on the way. Industry 
forums and institutions need to stay alert about the role they play in the 
knowledge sharing across industries and firms, because in small country like 
Finland, hypes can become exaggerated. Because the number of potential, 
interested participants in the industry forums is limited, a few topics may 
dominate the discussion at a time. As warned by Kahneman (2011), the risk of 
availability bias can distort the attention and commitment of managers towards 
certain phenomena and away from others. Therefore, industry forums and panels 
should recognize this threat and foster enough variation in the list of topics and 
participants to promote beneficial cross-pollination of new ideas. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I present first the key findings of my research and continue to an 
overall evaluation of my study and its limitations. I also suggest topics for further 
research before ending with my concluding remarks. 
6.1 Summary of the key findings 
Technological discontinuities bring about uncertainty about which opportunities 
and capabilities organizations should pursue. Based on my study, defining – and 
refining – the opportunities and needed capabilities, as well as their mutual 
matching, is iterative in nature. The sequence of matching alternates between 
outside-in assembly of capabilities based on identified opportunities and inside-
out search of opportunities based on existing capabilities. The speed of iterations 
may accelerate over the course of refining the opportunities and capabilities, from 
slow cycles in the early research stage to a point where inside-out and outside-in 
eventually merge together, e.g. in co-creation with customer. 
Managerial commitment affects the pattern of the matching. Strong managerial 
commitment to certain opportunities and capabilities can resolve the uncertainty 
intrinsic to the discontinuity, enabling the organization to engage in resolute 
capability building before all opportunities that can be achieved with the new 
capabilities are clear. In contrast, when the managerial commitment to a specific 
direction is low, the opportunities need to be defined first to allow investing 
scarce resources in building capabilities. 
Importantly, it is crucial for the managers to assess the speed and radicalness of 
the identified technological discontinuity, and align the organization’s pattern of 
strategy making according to it. A bottom-up strategy process can be applicable 
if the change happens more slowly and in stages, whereas a top-down strategy 
may be needed if the discontinuity necessitates more rapid and drastic responses. 
When assessing the nature of the discontinuity, the managers should try to avoid 
falling to the trap of availability bias, i.e., focusing only on the most hyped 
phenomena. Ensuring a great-enough variety of views and voices both within the 
firm and in the industry forums can help avoid the bias. 
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6.2 Evaluation of the study and limitations 
In an abductive study like this thesis, the findings are drawn both inductively 
from qualitative data but also deductively from prior literature in an iterative 
manner. Because the qualitative data is anyways interpreted subjectively and the 
theoretical examination must be eventually narrowed down to certain literature, 
it is eventually the researcher’s subjective evaluation and decision to conclude 
when the research is ‘ready’. However, the number of interviewees and interviews 
in each company seemed to be enough to reach the saturation point in the frame 
set by the chosen theoretical frameworks and personal interpretation. Over the 
course of the interviews, the same names started to become suggested when asked 
about further possible interviewees, and the topics brought forth in the answers 
either started to saturate or clearly deviated from the research focus. 
Furthermore, hypotheses and findings that emerged over the course of the 
research were discussed with the rest of the research team and especially with the 
instructor. Based on these discussions and further data analysis, the final findings 
were confirmed and refined. Although a longer observation period and for 
instance an access to follow managers’ work documents could have yielded a 
richer, more detailed data, I consider the overall quality of my research desirable 
for a Master’s Thesis. 
Nonetheless, my thesis naturally has also limitations. First of all, the data was 
collected in only three case firms, meaning that one must be careful in drawing 
generalizations. The case firms were relatively large incumbent manufacturers 
with business-to-business operations in a global scale. Depending on industry 
and the size of the company, the implications of a technological discontinuity and 
the patterns of matching opportunities and capabilities can be very different. For 
instance, each firm was operating in a rather mature market, where the barriers 
of entry were relatively high because of the high capital intensity. At the same 
time, in the scale of large software giants which would have the necessary capital, 
the markets were likely too small and growing too modestly to be attractive. A 
similar setting may not prevail in other industries, implying that the findings of 
this thesis need to be applied carefully. 
On the other hand, the implications may also be different for emergent players 
trying to outcompete incumbents. The case firms were originated from a small 
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European country with a long tradition in engineering complex technologies. 
New entrants from for instance emerging Asian economies do not share similar 
history, reputation and customer relationships, but compete with different means 
from the beginning. Furthermore, the managers’ potential interpretations of 
discontinuities, opportunities, and capabilities as well as the sense of urgency can 
be very different for managers stationed in a small Nordic country compared to 
areas with higher economic activity. 
6.3 Future research 
Since the data of this research were collected from a limited set of firms, future 
research could try to investigate whether the findings and propositions can be 
generalized beyond large Finnish manufacturing firms dealing with a 
technological discontinuity. If methodologically applicable, a survey of a large 
number of firms could extend our understanding of the topic. 
Regarding specifically the proposition 1, future research could examine closer 
which factors actually affect the speed of iterations between inside-out and 
outside-in in the matching process. Based on this study, the managerial 
commitment and sense of urgency play a role in accelerating or decelerating the 
process, but a closer look at for example the role of specific customers and other 
industry-specific characteristics could yield important findings. 
Regarding the proposition 2, it would be interesting to know more about the 
changes in managerial commitments. Do the changes in commitment lead to 
changes in how individual initiatives are promoted and managed, or to more 
fundamental changes in the organizations’ strategy processes? Because the 
managerial opportunity-capability interpretations and sense of urgency varied 
across the firms, a follow-up study with the same firms later could focus on 
finding out if the perceptions of the nature of discontinuity, as well as the ways to 
deal with it, remained the same or were changed. In addition, the follow-up study 
could try to assess the results objectively and, if possible, form more prescriptive 
recommendations for best practices.  
6.4 Concluding remarks 
In the context of large manufacturing firms, concepts such as digitization and 
industrial internet may appear to some managers as hyped fads without that 
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much novelty, while others feel a great urgency to capture the envisioned new 
opportunities. Therefore, the managerial cognitions about the nature of a 
technological discontinuity can also have a stronger effect on the organizational 
strategy process than possibly thought. For an organization wishing to cope with 
and also benefit from a discontinuity, it is important that the managerial 
interpretation of the change is accurate and that the strategy process is aligned 
for a proper response.  
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APPENDIX 
1. Interview guide questions used in the interviews 
 What kind of initiatives have you going on regarding digitalization, including both product 
and process-related use of IT? 
o [For each initiative, ask very briefly]: 
o When did the initiative start? 
o What is the main purpose of the initiative, in the sense that it is aiming for example 
mainly at the efficiency of internal operations, creation of customer value, or 
neither? 
o What was the motivation behind that? 
 If possible, could you tell in your own words the story of the most important initiatives from 
their inception to the current state? 
o How were these initiatives started?  
 What was the deciding factor in the go/no-go decision? 
 How easily / or quickly has the decision been made (duration: from idea to 
decision)? 
o Have they been top-down or bottom-up? 
o What was the initial motivation behind them? 
 Where did the idea come from? 
o From an external source or from someone in the company? 
o Do you follow what other players are doing in the same/some other industry 
regarding digitalization? 
 How is the initiative organized? 
o  Separate unit? 
o  Separate project? 
o  Staffing / resources allocated? 
o  Who’s in charge? Is there a high-level sponsor for the initiative? 
o  Could you elaborate on the roles of operating managers, the top management and 
the middle managers in between the two in these initiatives? 
o What has been the role of externals, such as the suppliers of the digital technologies, 
or consultants? 
o If you compare the current organization to the organization before the initiative, has 
something changed? 
o How are initiatives communicated / reported on throughout the organization?  
o What are the goals and specific targets for initiative? 
 [Follow-up:] Are there specific KPIs to track these targets? 
 What has been your own role in the initiative? 
 Have you identified some competences that are needed to make the initiative successful? 
o Do you have these competences? 
o How have you developed or acquired these competences? 
o If not, what are the obstacles in obtaining them? 
 How are your customers reacting to these initiatives? 
o If the initiative is already visible to the customers, how have they reacted? 
 [Possible clarification:] Is the reception positive, negative or neutral? 
 How are the initiatives perceived inside the organization? 
 What kind of challenges are there with these initiatives? 
o How are the challenges being managed? 
o What, in your opinion, has been essential for this initiative to be successful? 
 Have there been any further ideas or proposals for digitalization initiatives which haven’t 
proceeded to implementation? 
o What are the stories of these initiatives? 
o From where did these ideas originate? 
o Where did the initiatives stop? Why? 
o Who could tell us more about the digitalization initiatives that are on-going? 
o Who are the key people working on with them? 
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o What about the scrapped initiatives? 
 We have talked about the firm's strategy and initiatives; to wrap up the interview I have a 
few questions about culture. We often hear discussion about the Finnish companies being 
too technology oriented and not customer oriented enough. How do you see your corporate 
culture in this regard? 
o Do you have a strong customer orientation or efficiency orientation? 
o Can you share a story that many people at your company would know about 
somebody acting exceptionally well, according to the company values?  
o Could you tell, which professional group(s) in the company is/are generally 
considered as very distinguished, the ones that have the biggest role to play in the 
future success of the company? 
o How do the digitalization initiatives correspond to the company’s overall customer 
orientation/efficiency orientation? 
o Do you have an internal goal to be more customer oriented? 
 [If yes:] Do you think the digitalization projects are helping or hindering 
that goal, or are they rather neutral? 
 
